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Abstract
Level-1 Consensus is a property of a preference-profile. Intuitively, it means that there exists a
preference relation which induces an ordering of all other preferences such that frequent preferences
are those that are more similar to it. This is a desirable property, since it enhances the stability of
social choice by guaranteeing that there exists a Condorcet winner and it is elected by all scoring
rules.
In this paper, we present an algorithm for checking whether a given preference profile exhibits
level-1 consensus. We apply this algorithm to a large number of preference profiles, both real and
randomly-generated, and find that level-1 consensus is very improbable. We support these empirical
findings theoretically, by showing that, under the impartial culture assumption, the probability of
level-1 consensus approaches zero when the number of individuals approaches infinity.
Motivated by these observations, we show that the level-1 consensus property can be weakened
while retaining its stability implications. We call this weaker property Flexible Consensus. We
show, both empirically and theoretically, that it is considerably more probable than the original
level-1 consensus. In particular, under the impartial culture assumption, the probability for Flexible
Consensus converges to a positive number when the number of individuals approaches infinity.
JEL classification number: D71
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Mahajne et al. [11] have proposed the concept of level-1 consensus of a prefer-
ence profile, showing that it considerably enhances the stability of social choice. In particu-
lar, if a profile exhibits level-1 consensus around a given preference-relation 0 with respect
to the inversion metric, then:1
• There exists a Condorcet winner;
• The Condorcet winner is chosen by all scoring rules;
• With an odd number of individuals, the majority relation is transitive and coincides
with 0.
The current study starts by considering two questions:
1. How can a profile be tested for level-1 consensus?
2. How likely is it that level-1 consensus exists?
Questions of the former type have been recently studied with respect to various domain
restrictions. For example, Escoffier et al. [6] provide an efficient way to check whether a
profile is single-peaked, Bredereck et al. [3] provide an efficient way to check whether a
profile is single-crossing, and Barbera` and Moreno [1] ask whether the satisfaction of their
proposed top monotonicity condition (a sufficient condition for an extension of the median-
voter theorem to hold) is easy to check. See [5] for a survey of recent developments in
algorithmic checking of domain restrictions.
Questions of the latter type have been studied in the social choice literature with respect
to various domain restrictions that guarantee social stability, e.g., the existence of Condorcet
winners under the majority rule [7, 16] and the likelihood of single-peaked preferences [9].
Our answer to the first question is an efficient algorithm for determining whether a
preference-profile exhibits level-1 consensus. In case such a consensus exists, the algorithm
identifies a preference relation around which it occurs.
1 In fact, Mahajne et al. [11] define a family of conditions called level-r consensus, where r is an integer
between 1 and K!/2 and K is the number of alternatives. But for the sake of simplicity, in the present
paper we focus on level-1 consensus which is the strongest condition in this family.
Note that recently Poliakov [15] proved that level-r consensus is equivalent to level-1 consensus whenever
r ≤ (K − 1)!.
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Our answer to the second question is that level-1 consensus is highly improbable. We
applied our algorithm on a recently-released dataset of 315 real-world profiles from various
sources [14] and found that none of them exhibits level-1-consensus. Moreover, experiments
performed on thousands of profiles generated randomly according to Mallows’ phi model [12]
revealed that, for a wide range of parameter settings, profiles exhibiting level-1 consensus
were extremely rare. As a partial explanation to these findings, we prove that under the
standard probabilistic setting of equally-probable preference relations, the probability of
level-1 consensus goes to zero when the number of individuals goes to infinity.
Motivated by these results, we found a way to weaken the level-1 consensus property while
keeping its stability properties. We call the weakened property Flexible Consensus. In the
above mentioned dataset, we found that 39 out of 315 profiles exhibit Flexible Consensus.
Flexible Consensus is also much more probable in the settings of the randomly-generated
profiles we tested. In particular, under the impartial-culture assumption, the probability
of Flexible Consensus is lower-bounded by a positive constant even when the number of
individuals goes to infinity.
II. DEFINITIONS
Let A = {a1, . . . , aK} be a set of K ≥ 3 alternatives and N = {1, . . . , n} a set of voters.
We assume that each voter has a strict total order on the alternatives, i.e, for each two
different alternatives a and b, either the voter strictly prefers a to b or the voter strictly
prefers b to a. Let P be the subset of strict total orders on A. We will refer to the elements
of P as preference relations or simply as preferences.
A preference profile or simply a profile is a list pi = (1, . . . ,n) of preference relations
on A. For each i ∈ N , i is the preference relation of voter i. We denote by Pn the set of
all possible profiles.
Let pi = (1, . . . ,n) be a profile. For each preference ∈ P , let µpi() := |{i ∈ N :i=
}| = the number of voters whose preference is , which in this paper is referred to as the
frequency of .
Definition 1. The inversion distance between two preferences ,′, denoted d(,′), is
the number of pairs of alternatives that are ranked differently by the two preferences, i.e,
the number of sets {a, b} ⊆ A such that a  b and b ′ a or vice-versa.
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The inversion-distance is a metric on P [8]. It can vary between 0 and (K
2
)
, the number
of subsets of two alternatives.
For example, if there are three alternatives and a1  a3  a2 and a2 ′ a3 ′ a1, then
d(,′) = 3 since all three pairs of alternatives are ranked differently by  and ′.
The following definition is due to Mahajne et al. [11].
Definition 2. Let 0∈ P . A profile pi ∈ Pn exhibits consensus of level-1 around 0 if the
following two conditions hold:
1. For all pairs of preferences ,′∈ P , d(,0) ≤ d(′,0) implies µpi() ≥ µpi(′).
2. There is at least one pair ,′∈ P , such that d(,0) < d(′,0) and µpi() >
µpi(′).
III. ALGORITHM FOR DETECTING LEVEL-1 CONSENSUS
Given a profile pi ∈ Pn, we would like to check whether there exists some preference-
relation 0 such that pi exhibits level-1 consensus around it. Our solution is given by
Algorithm 1 in page 5 (using, as a sub-routine, Algorithm 2 in page 6).
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 checks whether a profile pi exhibits level-1 consensus in time:
O(n′2K
√
logK + n′2 log n′)
where n′ = min(K!, n). In particular, the run-time is polynomial in the profile size.
This entire section is devoted to proving Theorem 1. We first explain why Algorithm 1
is correct. Then we analyze its run-time.
Algorithm 1 is based on the simple observation that the two conditions in Definition 2
are equivalent to the following:
(Condition 1) For all,′∈ P , if µpi(′) > µpi(), then d(′,0) < d(,0).
(Condition 2) There exists a pair ,′∈ P such that µpi(′) > µpi().
The algorithm proceeds in several steps.
First, we calculate the frequency µpi() of each of the preferences ∈ pi. Let n′ be the
number of distinct preferences in pi. Note that n′ ≤ n and also n′ ≤ K!, since with K
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Algorithm 1 Detection of Level-1 Consensus
INPUT:
• A set of K alternatives, A = {a1, . . . , aK}.
• A profile pi containing n preference-relations on A (possibly with duplicates).
OUTPUT:
• If pi exhibits level-1 consensus around some preference 0, return 0.
• Otherwise, return “no consensus”.
ALGORITHM:
1. Calculate the frequency µpi() of each preference ∈ pi.
2. Define n′ = number of distinct preferences in pi.
3. If all frequencies are equal and n′ = K!, return “no consensus; Condition 2 violated”.
4. Order the preferences by descending frequency: µpi(1) ≥ µpi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ µpi(n′).
5. Set M := µpi(1) to be the maximum frequency of a preference relation.
6. For j = 1, 2, . . . n′ while µpi(j) = M :
Check if Condition 1 is satisfied for pi and j (see Algorithm 2). If it is, then return j .
7. Return “no consensus; Condition 1 is violated for all candidates”.
alternatives there are at most K! possible preferences. Now Condition 2 is easily checked: it
is satisfied if-and-only-if (a) there exists a pair of preferences in pi with different frequencies,
or (b) n′ < K! (since this implies that there exists a preference not in pi with frequency 0).
If Condition 2 is satisfied, it only remains to check whether Condition 1 is satisfied as
well.
We order the preferences in descending order of µpi(), and rename them 1,2, . . . ,n′ ,
such that µpi(1) ≥ µpi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ µpi(n′). This enables us to identify the candidates for
level-1-consensus. Since d(0,0) = 0, Condition 1 immediately implies that each candidate
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Algorithm 2 Check if Condition 1 is satisfied
INPUT:
• A profile pi containing n preference-relations on A (possibly with duplicates).
• A preference 0.
OUTPUT: “True” if Condition 1 is satisfied for profile pi with respect to 0. “False” otherwise.
ALGORITHM:
1. Within every group of preferences with the same frequency, order the preferences by
ascending inversion-distance from 0.
2. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n′ − 1:
If µpi(i) > µpi(i+1) and d(i,0) ≥ d(i+1,0), return False.
3. Set d̂ := d(n′ ,0). If
∑d̂
j=0 |T (K, j)| = n, return True. Else, return False.
for level-1 consensus must be a preference with maximal frequency. So, the candidates are
1,2, . . . ,h such that h ≤ n′ is the largest index for which µpi(1) = µpi(2) = · · · =
µpi(h).
Now we can directly check Condition 1. This condition should be checked separately
for each candidate preference 0. Given a candidate-preference 0, we can calculate its
inversion-distance from each preference i∈ pi , d(i,0). Now, we represent the profile pi
relative to 0 in the form of a scatter-plot, which will lead to a straight-forward assessment
of the profile’s consensus status. Our scatter-plot is a plot whose x-axis denotes the distance
d(i,0) and whose y-axis denotes the frequency µpi(i). Note that there may be several
different preference relations i with the same frequency, µpi(i) = m. Therefore, for
each integer value on the y-axis of the scatter-plot, m, we may have several corresponding
values on the x-axis, which can be represented by a horizontal segment whose maximum
and minimum borders are given by maxi:µpi(i)=m d(i,0) and mini:µpi(i)=m d(i,0),
respectively.
Condition 1 above requires that, for every two frequencies m1 > m2, all preferences with
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FIG. 1. Scatter-plot representation of profiles relative to a candidate preference enables to
graphically check whether level-1 consensus around that candidate is satisfied. The left plot satisfies
Condition 1 since the horizontal segments are decreasing and non-overlapping. The middle and
right plots violate Condition 1 since there are overlapping segments (circled).
frequency m1 are closer to 0 than all preferences with frequency m2: maxi:µpi(i)=m1 d(i
,0) < mini:µpi(i)=m2 d(i,0). Graphically (see Figure 1), this means that when we scan
the scatter plot from top to bottom, we must see non-overlapping intervals ordered strictly
from left to right.
Three examples are shown in Figure 1. The left example is positive: there are 5 non-
overlapping intervals (two of which consist of a single point), and when they are scanned
from top to bottom, they are ordered strictly from left to right. Therefore Condition 1 holds.
The middle and right examples are negative: the second and third intervals from the top
overlap. For instance, in the middle example the overlap is in a single point, x = 2. This
point corresponds to two distinct preferences with different frequencies (5 and 4), both of
which are at distance 2 from the candidate preference; these preferences violate Condition 1.
The process of ’scanning the scatter plot from top to bottom’ can be formalized as follows
(see Algorithm 2). Order the list of preferences lexicographically by two criteria: the pri-
mary criterion is descending frequency (as before), and the secondary criterion is ascending
distance. So the preferences are partitioned to equivalence classes by their frequency: the
classes are ordered by descending frequency, and within each equivalence-class, the prefer-
ences are ordered by ascending distance from 0. Preferences with both the same frequency
and the same distance are ordered arbitrarily. Under this ordering, the following lemma
holds:
Lemma 1. If Condition 1 is violated for any pair of preference relations in pi, then it is
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violated for an adjacent pair i,i+1 for some i.
The lemma is easy to understand based on the graphical criterion outlined above. A
formal proof is provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 implies that in order to ensure that Condition 1 is satisfied for all preferences
in pi, it is sufficient to scan the ordered list of preferences from 1 to n′ , and check if there
is some i such that µpi(i) > µpi(i+1) and d(i,0) ≥ d(i+1,0).
If Condition 1 holds for all preferences in pi, it remains to check that it holds for preferences
not in pi, i.e, preferences with zero frequency. Let d̂ be the largest distance from a preference
in pi to 0, i.e, d̂ = d(n′ ,0). Condition 1 implies that, if µpi() = 0, then d(,0) > d̂.
Therefore, we have to check that the distances between 0 and preferences not in pi are all
larger than d̂. Equivalently, we can ensure that all preferences with distance at most d̂ are
in pi. This can be checked by calculating the number of possible preferences with distance
at most d̂, and verifying that it is equal to the total number n′ of distinct preferences in pi.
Since this number involves all possible preferences, it does not depend on the candidate 0.
Therefore, we can calculate this number assuming w.l.o.g that 0 is the preference defined
by 1 0 2 0 . . . 0 K. So we have to calculate the number of permutations on K elements
with at most d̂ inversions (out-of-order elements). This can be written as:
d̂∑
j=0
|T (K, j)|
where T (K, j) is the set of permutations on K elements with exactly j inversions.2
The number |T (K, j)| can be calculated using the following recurrence relation
• ∀K : |T (K, 0)| = 1, since there is exactly one permutation with zero inversions — the
identity permutation.
• ∀j : |T (0, j)| = 0, since there are no permutations with 0 elements.
• ∀K, j : |T (K, j)| = ∑min(K−1,j)i=0 |T (K − 1, j − i)|: for any permutation of 1, . . . , K
with j inversions, let i be the number of elements that come after element K in that
permutation. Since K is larger than all other elements, there are exactly i inversions
involving K. Therefore, if we remove K, we get a permutation of 1, . . . , K − 1 with
2 |T (K, j)| is also known as the Mahonian number ; see OEIS sequence A008302, https://oeis.org/A008302.
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exactly j− i inversions. By summing the counts of these permutations for all possible
values of i (namely, i ≥ 0, i ≤ j, i ≤ K − 1) we get |T (K, j)|.
The algorithm for detecting Level-1 Consensus is summarized in Algorithm 1 in page 5.
We complete the proof of Theorem 1 by a run-time analysis.
Lemma 2. The run-time of Algorithm 1 is:
O(n′2K
√
logK + n′2 log n′)
where n′ ≤ min(K!, n) is the number of distinct preferences in pi.
Proof. We first analyze Algorithm 2. It has to calculate the distance between 0 and
each of the other n′ − 1 preferences. Calculating the inversion distance between a given
pair of preferences can be done by a recently-developed algorithm [4] with a runtime of
O(K
√
logK). We then have to order the n′ distinct preferences and then scan them from
top to bottom. Ordering n′ items can be done in time O(n′ log n′). The value of n′ is at
most the maximum of n (the number of voters) and K! (the number of possible preferences).
So the run-time of Algorithm 2 is
O(n′K
√
logK + n′ log n′)
As will be explained in the next section, the probability of having two preferences exhibiting
exactly the same frequency is low, so in most cases we will have to apply Algorithm 2 only
once. However, in the improbable case in which there are many preferences with the same
frequency, we would have to apply it at most n′ times. Therefore, the worst-case run-time
of Algorithm 1 is n′ times the run-time of Algorithm 2.
IV. PROBABILITY OF LEVEL-1 CONSENSUS
Equipped with a procedure for checking level-1 consensus, we set out to check how likely
is this property in various settings. We conducted several simulation experiments.
In the first experiment we used the PrefLib database [14], an online database of real-world
preference-profiles collected from various sources. This database contains 315 full profiles,
with different numbers of alternatives and voters; see Table I for statistics. For each profile,
we used the algorithm described in the previous section to check whether there exists a
9
Code Description # profiles # alternatives # voters
ED-00004 1–100:
Netflix Prize Data [2]
Rankings of movies
by consumers. 100 3 100–1000
ED-00004 101-200:
Netflix Prize Data [2]
Rankings of movies
by consumers. 100 4 100–1000
ED-00006:
Skate Data
Ranking of skaters
by judges in competitions. 20 10–25 8–10
ED-00009:
AGH Course Selection
Ranking of courses
by university students. 2 7–9 ≈ 150
ED-00011:
Web Search
Ranking of search-phrases
by search-engines. 3 100–250 5
ED-00012:
T shirt
Ranking of T-shirt designs
by researchers. 1 10 30
ED-00014:
Sushi Data
Ranking of sushi kinds
by consumers. 1 10 5000
ED-00014:
Sushi Data
Ranking of sushi kinds
by consumers. 1 10 5000
ED-00015:
Clean Web Search
Ranking of search-phrases
by search-engines. 79 10–250 4
ED-00024:
Mechanical Turk Dots [13]
Ranking of dot-sets
by Amazon-Turk workers. 4 4 ≈ 800
ED-00025:
Mechanical Turk Puzzle [13]
Ranking of puzzles
by Amazon-Turk workers. 4 4 ≈ 800
ED-00032:
Education Surveys
Ranking of issues
by informatics students. 1 6 15
TABLE I. Summary of PrefLib [14] data-sets used in our experiments.
1-level consensus. The results were striking: none of the 315 profiles exhibited a level-1
consensus.
In the second experiment we used preference-profiles that were generated according to
Mallows’ phi model [12], which was claimed to favor level-1 consensus [11]. Mallows’ model
assumes that there is a “correct” preference ∗, and the actual preferences of the voters
are noisy variants of it. The probability of a preference  depends on its inversion distance
from the correct preference: d(,∗). The strength of this dependence is determined by a
parameter φ ∈ (0, 1], where lower φ means higher dependence; when φ→ 0 the preferences
of all voters are identical and equal to ∗, while when φ = 1 the preference of each voter is
selected uniformly at random from the K! possible orderings on K items. In general, the
probability of each preference-relation  is given by [10]:
Prob
[  | φ,∗ ] = 1
Z
· φd(,∗)
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FIG. 2. Percentage of profiles, from a set of profiles selected at random according to Mallows’
phi model, which exhibit level-1-consensus, single-peakedness, or Flexible Consensus (the latter is
defined in Section V).
where Z is a normalization factor.
We considered all 6 combinations of K ∈ {3, 4, 5} alternatives and n ∈ {100, 1000}
voters, where φ varied between 0 and 1. For each combination of K,n, φ we ran 1000
experiments and calculated (a) the fraction of profiles that exhibit level-1 consensus, (b)
the fraction of profiles that are single-peaked,3 and (c) the fraction of profiles that exhibit
Flexible Consensus, which will be presented in the next section. The results are shown in
Figure 2. As can be expected, consensus always exists when φ = 0, since in this case there is
a deterministic consensus on the “true” preference. Additionally, when there are 100 voters
and 3 alternatives and φ is small, a small positive percentage of the profiles exhibit a level-1
consensus (top left plot). In all other cases, the percentage of level-1 consensus profiles drops
to 0 when φ ≥ 0.05.
3 This calculation was done for the sake of comparison. It was implemented using Nicholas Mattei’s PrefLib
tools, which are freely available at GitHub: https://github.com/nmattei/PrefLib-Tools .
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Why is level-1 consensus so rare?
Intuitively, the reason is that it requires groups of preferences to have exactly the same
frequency in the population. Condition 1 implies that if d(i,0) = d(j,0) then µpi(i) =
µpi(j). For every K ≥ 3 and for every candidate 0, there exist at least two preferences
with the same distance from the candidate, d(i,0) = d(j,0). Hence, a necessary
condition for level-1 consensus is that there exist at least two preferences with exactly the
same frequency. As the number of voters goes to ∞, the probability that any specific
preference-relation appears with any specific frequency goes to 0. Therefore, the probability
that two preference-relations have the same frequency goes to 0 too.
To formalize this intuition, we present an asymptotic upper bound on the probability of
level-1 consensus for the case φ = 1. This is the case of impartial culture, in which all K!
preferences are equally probable.
We select a preference-profile pi according to the following random process, parametrized
by K (the number of alternatives) and an integer-valued parameter m.
• Let (i)K!i=1 be an enumeration of the preferences in P .
• For each i, draw a number Bi according to a binomial distribution with m trials and
success-probability 1/K!.
• Return a profile in which, for every i, there are Bi voters whose preference is i.
All the Bi’s are i.i.d. random variables with mean value µ :=
m
K!
. The total number of
preferences in the profile pi is n =
∑K!
i=1Bi; this is also a random variable, and its mean
value is E[n] =
∑K!
i=1
m
K!
= m. The process is symmetric with respect to the preferences in
P , so all preferences are equally likely, in accordance with the impartial-culture assumption.
Define P consensus(m,K) as the probability that the above random process yields a profile
that exhibits Level-1 Consensus. The rest of the section is devoted to proving the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. For every K:
lim
m→∞
P consensus(m,K) = 0
Proof. We first show an upper bound on the probability for level-1 consensus around a fixed
preference.
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Let 0 be a fixed preference. Denote by P con-fixed(m,K) the probability that a profile
pi, selected according to the random process above with parameters m,K, exhibits Level-1
Consensus around 0. Since all preferences are equally probable, P con-fixed(m,K) is the same
for all 0. We now present an approximate upper bound on P con-fixed(m,K).
Recall that T (K, d) is the set of distinct preferences whose inversion-distance from 0 is
exactly d, where d can vary between 0 and
(
K
2
)
(the number of pairs of K alternatives). The
conditions for Level-1 Consensus imply that all preferences in T (K, d) must have the same
frequency in pi, i.e:
For all i, j such that i∈ T (K, d) and j∈ T (K, d) : Bi = Bj (1)
Let P equal(m, p, t) be the probability that t i.i.d. random variables distributed like
Binom[m, p] are equal. Then, (1) implies that:
P con-fixed(m,K) ≤
(K2 )∏
d=0
P equal
(
m,
1
K!
, |T (K, d)|
)
(2)
In Appendix C, we show that P equal(m, p, t) can be approximated as:
P equal(m, p, t) ≈ 1
(
√
2pipqm)t−1
where q = 1 − p and the symbol ≈ means that the ratio of the expressions in its two sides
goes to 1 as m→∞. Therefore, (2) can be approximated as:
P con-fixed(m,K) ≤ ≈ 1/
√√√√√(K2 )∏
d=0
(
2pi
1
K!
m
)[|T (k,d)|−1]
= 1/
√√√√(2pim
K!
)∑(K2 )
d=0 [|T (k,d)|−1]
(3)
The sum in the exponent can be simplified as follows:
(K2 )∑
d=0
[|T (k, d)| − 1] =
(
K
2 )∑
d=0
|T (k, d)|
− (K
2
)
− 1
The sum of |T (K, d)| over all possible values of d (i.e, d between 0 and (K
2
)
) equals the total
number of different preferences over K items, which is K!:
(K2 )∑
d=0
|T (k, d)| = K! (4)
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Substituting in (3) gives:
P con-fixed(m,K) ≤ ≈ 1/
√(
2pim
K!
)K!−(K2 )−1
Recall that P con-fixed(m,K) is the probability of level-1 consensus around a fixed prefer-
ence. The probability of level-1 consensus around any preference is, by the union bound, at
most this probability times the number of possible preferences, i.e,
P consensus(m, k) ≤ K! · P con-fixed(m,K)
≤ K!√(
2pim
K!
)K!−(K2 )−1
so for every fixed K ≥ 3, limm→∞ P consensus(m, k) = 0.
As an illustration, with K = 3 alternatives we get an upper bound of 6/
√
(2pim/6)2 ∈
O(1/m); with K = 4 alternatives the upper bound is 24/
√
(2pim/24)17 ∈ O(1/m8.5). The
rate of convergence to zero is faster when K is larger.
V. FLEXIBLE CONSENSUS
Motivated by the low probability of a level-1 consensus, we suggest below a weakened
variant of this property termed Flexible Consensus. It is equivalent to a weakened version
of Condition 1, without Condition 2.
Definition 3. Let 0∈ P . A profile pi ∈ Pn exhibits Flexible Consensus around 0 if the
following condition holds:
(Flexible Condition 1)
For all ′,, if µpi(′) > µpi(), then d(′,0) ≤ d(,0).
The only difference between Condition 1 and Flexible Condition 1 is that d(′,0) <
d(,0) is replaced by d(′,0) ≤ d(,0). It will be shown below that this apparently
minor change significantly increases the probability that the condition is satisfied, while
keeping the desirable stability properties of the original condition. Moreover, these stability
properties hold even without Condition 2.4
4 Our proofs below closely follow the proofs of [11]. Their proofs are stated for level-r consensus for general
r, and indeed Flexible Condition 1 can also be adapted to general r, but for the sake of simplicity we
prefer to focus on the case r = 1.
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A. First stability property: Existence of a Condorcet winner
Definition 4. Given a profile pi, the majority relation Mpi is defined as follows: aMpib iff,
in a vote between alternatives a and b, a beats b by a weak majority. I.e, the number of
preferences in pi by which a  b is at least as large as the number of preferences in pi by
which b  a.
Lemma 3. Let pi ∈ Pn be a profile of n voters and 0∈ P a preference-relation such that
Flexible Condition 1 is satisfied. Then, for any two alternatives a, b:
(1) If a 0 b (a is preferred to b by 0) then aMpib.
(2) If n is odd then the opposite is also true: if aMpib then a 0 b.
(3) If n is even then the opposite is “almost” true: if aMpib then either a 0 b or a 1 b,
where 1 is another preference around which there is Flexible Consensus.5
Proof. (1) Suppose that a 0 b. Partition P , the set of K! possible preferences, to two
subsets:
• The subset C(a > b) containing the K!/2 preferences for which a  b;
• The subset C(b > a) containing the K!/2 preferences for which b  a.
Let wab : C(b > a) → C(a > b) be the bijection that takes a preference in C(b > a)
and switches a with b in the ranking. Since a 0 b, this switch brings every preference in
C(b > a) at least one step closer to 0. I.e, for every preference ∈ C(b > a) it holds that
d(wab(),0) < d(,0) (see proof in Appendix B).
By Flexible Condition 1, this implies that µpi(w
ab()) ≥ µpi(). So for every preference 
by which b is preferred to a corresponds a unique preference wab() by which a is preferred
to b, which is at least as frequent. Therefore, a beats b by a weak majority: aMpib.
(2) When n is odd and aMpib, the majority must be strict, so it is not true that bMpia.
Hence, by (1), it is not true that b 0 a. By our assumption, 0 is a strict total order.
Therefore, a 0 b.
(3) When n is even and aMpib, there are two cases: if a 0 b then we are done. If b 0 a,
then a 1 b, where 1= wab(0). It remains to prove that there is Flexible Consensus
around wab(0).
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this additional condition.
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Step I. Since b 0 a, the argument in (1) shows that, for every preference ∈ C(a > b),
the frequency µpi(w
ab()) ≥ µpi(). But since aMpib, all these inequalities must be equalities,
i.e, for every preference ∈ C(a > b), we must have µpi(wab()) = µpi().
Step II. For every two preferences ,′: d(,′) = d(wab(), wab(′)). To see this,
consider the pairs of alternatives that are inversed between ,′. If, in each such pair, we
replace a by b and b by a, then we get exactly the pairs of alternatives that are inversed
between wab() and wab(′).
Step III. Let ′, be two preferences for which d(′, wab(0)) < d(, wab(0)). Then,
by Step II, d(wab(′),0) < d(wab(),0). Since there is Flexible Consensus around 0,
this implies: µpi(w
ab(′)) ≥ µpi(wab()). By Step I, this implies: µpi(′) ≥ µpi(). Hence,
there is Flexible Consensus around wab(0).
Definition 5. For every preference 0∈ P , the alternative ranked first according to 0 is
denoted by Best(0)
Definition 6. Given a profile pi ∈ Pn, a weak Condorcet winner of pi is an alternative a
that beats all other alternatives by a weak majority, i.e, for any other alternative b, aMpib.
Theorem 2. Let pi ∈ Pn be a profile and 0∈ P a preference-relation around which there
is Flexible Consensus. Then Best(0) is a weak Condorcet winner of pi.
Moreover, if n is odd then 0 coincides with the majority relation Mpi, and 0 is the
unique preference in P for which Flexible Condition 1 is satisfied.
Proof. Let a := Best(0). So for every b 6= a, a 0 b. By Lemma 3, this implies that aMpib.
Hence, a is a weak Condorcet winner of pi.
When n is odd, Lemma 3 implies that a 0 b iff aMpib, so 0 coincides with the ordering
induced by Mpi. This is true for any preference in P for which Flexible Condition 1 holds,
so any such preference coincides with 0.
B. Second stability property: agreement of scoring rules
A scoring rule is a rule for selecting an alternative based on a profile.
Definition 7. A scoring rule is a rule characterized by a vector S of length K, S1 ≥ · · · ≥
SK . Given a profile pi, for each preference ∈ pi, the rule assigns score S1 to the alternative
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ranked first by , S2 to the alternative ranked second by , and so on. The rule then sums
the scores assigned to each alternative by all preferences in pi, and selects the alternative/s
that received the highest total score.
In general, every scoring-rule S might select a different alternative. But below we show
that, if a profile exhibits Flexible Consensus, then there is an alternative which is selected
all scoring rules.
Lemma 4. Let pi ∈ Pn be a profile and 0∈ P a preference-relation such that Flexible
Condition 1 is satisfied. Then, for any two alternatives a, b and any scoring-rule S, if
a 0 b then the score of a is at least as large as the score of b.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 3, we partition P into two subsets, C(a > b) and
C(b > a), and define the bijection wab between them.
For every scoring-rule S and preference ∈ P , define ∆S,a,b() as the difference between
the score of a in  and the score of b in . By definition of a scoring rule:
• For every preference ∈ C(a > b), ∆S,a,b() is weakly-positive.
• For every preference ∈ C(b > a), ∆S,a,b() is weakly-negative.
• For every preference ∈ P , ∆S,a,b() = −∆S,a,b(wab()).
Given the scoring rule S and the profile pi, define ∆S,a,b(pi) as the difference between the
total score of a in pi and the total score of b in pi. Then, by definition:
∆S,a,b(pi) =
∑
∈P
µpi() ·∆S,a,b()
=
∑
∈C(a>b)
µpi() ·∆S,a,b() +
∑
∈C(b>a)
µpi() ·∆S,a,b()
=
∑
∈C(a>b)
[
µpi() ·∆S,a,b() + µpi(wab()) ·∆S,a,b(wab())
]
=
∑
∈C(a>b)
[
µpi() ·∆S,a,b()− µpi(wab()) ·∆S,a,b()
]
=
∑
∈C(a>b)
∆S,a,b() ·
[
µpi()− µpi(wab())
]
Since a 0 b, for every preference ∈ C(a > b), the lemma in Appendix B implies that
d(wab(),0) > d(,0). Hence, by Flexible Condition 1, µpi() ≥ µpi(wab(). Hence, all
terms in the last sum are weakly-positive. Hence, ∆S(pi) ≥ 0 and the lemma is proved.
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Algorithm 3 Detection of Flexible Consensus
INPUT:
• A set of K alternatives, A = {a1, . . . , aK}.
• A profile pi containing n preference-relations on A (possibly with duplicates).
OUTPUT:
• If pi exhibits Flexible Consensus around some preference 0, return 0.
• Otherwise, return “no consensus”.
ALGORITHM:
1. Calculate the frequency µpi() of each preference ∈ pi.
2. Define n′ = number of distinct preferences in pi.
3. Order the preferences by descending frequency: µpi(1) ≥ µpi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ µpi(n′).
4. Set M := µpi(1) to be the maximum frequency of a preference relation.
5. For j = 1, 2, . . . n′ while µpi(j) = M : Check if Flexible Condition 1 is satisfied for pi and
j (see Algorithm 4). If it is, then return j .
6. Return “no consensus; Flexible Condition 1 is violated for all candidates”.
Theorem 3. Let pi ∈ Pn be a profile and 0∈ P a preference-relation such that Flexible
Condition 1 is satisfied. Then the score assigned to Best(0) by every scoring rule is at
least as high as the score assigned to any other alternative by the same rule.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 4.
VI. ALGORITHM FOR DETECTING FLEXIBLE CONSENSUS
Checking the existence of Flexible Consensus is very similar to checking Level-1 Con-
sensus. The check is presented in Algorithm 3. It is very similar to Algorithm 1; the
only differences are that we do not need to check Condition 2 (since it does not exist in
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Algorithm 4 Check if Flexible Condition 1 is satisfied
INPUT:
• A profile pi containing n preference-relations on A (possibly with duplicates).
• A preference 0.
OUTPUT: “True” if Flexible Condition 1 is satisfied for pi and 0. “False” otherwise.
ALGORITHM:
1. Order preferences with the same frequency by ascending inversion-distance from 0.
2. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n′ − 1:
If µpi(i) > µpi(i+1) and d(i,0) > d(i+1,0), return False.
3. Set d̂ := d(n′ ,0). Define n∗ as the number of profiles in pi whose distance to 0 is at
most d̂− 1. If ∑d̂−1j=0 T (K, j) = n∗, return True. Else, return False.
Flexible-Level-1-Consensus), and instead of checking Condition 1 for each candidate, we
check Flexible-Condition-1.
The procedure for checking Flexible Condition 1 is presented as Algorithm 4. It is very
similar to the one for checking Condition 1 in Algorithm 2. There are two differences: the
inequality that leads to the failure of the procedure is d(i,0) > d(i+1,0) (instead of
d(i,0) ≥ d(i+1,0)), and in the last step we have to check that there is no preference
outside of pi whose distance to 0 is less than d̂ (instead of less-than-or-equal-to d̂). Hence,
by following the same proof as in Section III, it is easy to prove:
Theorem 4. Algorithm 3 checks whether a profile pi exhibits Flexible Consensus in time:
O(n′2K
√
logK + n′2 log n′)
where n′ = min(K!, n).
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VII. PROBABILITY OF FLEXIBLE CONSENSUS
We applied Algorithm 3 to the same experimental settings described in Section IV and
estimated the probability of having Flexible Consensus. Out of the 315 PrefLib profiles,
39 exhibit Flexible Consensus. All 39 profiles are from the dataset labeled “ED-00004 1–
100”, where all profiles have 3 alternatives. This means that 39% of all these profiles with
3 alternatives exhibited the Flexible Consensus (in contrast to 0 which exhibited level-1
consensus).
The results of the experiments on random profiles are shown in Figure 2 in page 11; it
is evident that in all settings, including the most challenging setting of impartial culture
(φ = 1), Flexible Consensus is substantially more probable than level-1 consensus.
We complement the empirical findings with a theoretical analysis of the asymptotic prob-
ability of Flexible Consensus under the impartial culture assumption. We consider a profile
generated by the random process described before Proposition 1 in page 12. We denote by
P flexible-consensus(m,K) the probability that such a random profile exhibits Flexible Consen-
sus. In stark contrast to Proposition 1, we prove that this probability is always larger than
a positive constant, even when the number of voters goes to infinity:
Proposition 2. For every K there exists a constant CK > 0 such that:
∀m : P flexible-consensus(m,K) ≥ CK
Proof. As explained in the proof of Proposition 1, the probability that two or more pref-
erences have exactly the same frequency goes to 0 when m → ∞, so for simplicity we
neglect this possibility and assume that each preference relation has a different frequency.
Note that this assumption can only decrease the probability of Flexible Consensus, since
it implies that there is a unique preference with maximum frequency, so there is only one
candidate that can possibly satisfy Flexible Condition 1. We denote this candidate by 0.
Below we calculate the probability that Flexible Condition 1 holds for this preference.
For every i ≥ 1, define:
Fi := { µpi() | d(,0) = i }
so Fi contains the frequencies of all preferences whose distance from0 is exactly i. Note that
Fi is non-empty only when i ≤
(
K
2
)
, since
(
K
2
)
is the maximum possible inversion-distance
between two preferences on K alternatives.
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Flexible Condition 1 is equivalent to the requirement that each member of the set Fi is
larger than each member of the set Fj, for every i < j.
6 However, it does not impose any
restrictions on the frequencies within Fi.
Let F := ∪iFi = the set of frequencies of the K!− 1 preferences different than 0. The
total number of different orders on F is |F |!. The total number of orders that satisfy Flexible
Condition 1 is |F1|! · |F2|! · · · |F(K2 )|!. Since all preferences are equally likely, all |F |! orders
are equally likely. Therefore, the probability that the order of frequencies satisfies Flexible
Condition 1 is at least:
|F1|!|F2|! · · · |F(K2 )|!
|F |! (5)
which is a positive constant that does not approach 0 even when m→∞.
As an illustration, we calculate the lower bound for K = 3 alternatives. In this case
we have |F1| = 2 and |F2| = 2 and |F3| = 1 and |F | = 2 + 2 + 1 = 5. Therefore, the
probability that Flexible Condition 1 is satisfied in a random impartial-culture profile is at
least 2! · 2! · 1!/5! = 1/30 ≈ 0.033. In our experiments with φ = 1, the fraction of profiles
with Flexible Consensus (in 1000 experiments) was 0.045 for 100 voters and 0.043 for 1000
voters. This is slightly higher than the lower bound of 0.033, which can be explained by the
fact that, when n is finite, there is a positive probability that two preferences have the same
frequency.
When K > 3, the asymptotic probability of Flexible Condition 1 in an impartial culture
remains positive, though much lower. For example, for K = 4 the lower bound is approxi-
mately 10−12. This is consistent with the fact that we found no profiles that exhibit Flexible
Consensus in our experiments with φ = 1 and K ≥ 4.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a practical procedure for checking whether a preference-profile exhibits a
level-1 consensus. We realized that this property is highly improbable, and found a weaker
property, Flexible Consensus, that preserves the desirable stability properties of the social
choice. Furthermore, Flexible Consensus is provably more likely than level-1 consensus.
6 In fact, it is equivalent to the requirement that each member of Fi is larger than or equal to each member
of Fj , but as explained above, we neglect the possibility that two preferences have equal frequency.
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This was demonstrated both theoretically (for the impartial culture setting) and empirically
and over a database of real-world profiles.
Our experiments can be reproduced by re-running the code, which is freely available
through the following GitHub fork: https://github.com/erelsgl/PrefLib-Tools .
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: To verify Condition 1, it is sufficient to check adjacent preferences
This section provides a formal proof to the following lemma used in subsection III.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the preference relations in a profile pi are ordered by two criteria:
first by frequency µpi(i), then by distance d(i,0), where 0 is a fixed preference. In
this ordering, if Condition 1 is violated for any pair of preference relations in pi, then it is
violated for an adjacent pair i,i+1 for some i.
Proof. Suppose that there exist indices i < j such that Condition 1 is violated for the pair
i,j, i.e, µpi(i) > µpi(j), yet d(i,0) ≥ d(j,0). We now prove the lemma by
induction on the difference of indices, j − i.
Base: If j − i = 1, then i and j are already adjacent, so we are done.
Step: Suppose that j− i > 1. We prove that there exists a pair with a smaller difference
that violates Condition 1. We consider several cases.
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Case #1 : i is not the largest index in its equivalence class. i.e, there exists i′ > i such
that µpi(i′) = µpi(i). Then, by the secondary ordering criterion, d(i′ ,0) ≥ d(i,0),
Condition 1 is violated for the pair i′ and j.
Case #2 : j is not the smallest index in its equivalence class. i.e, there exists j′ < j such
that µpi(j′) = µpi(j). Then, by the secondary ordering criterion, d(j,0) ≥ d(j′ ,0),
Condition 1 is violated for the pair i and j′ .
Otherwise, i is the largest index in its equivalence class, j is the smallest index in its
equivalence class, but still i+ 1 < j. This means that the equivalence classes of i and j are
not adjacent, i.e, µpi(i) > µpi(i+1) > µpi(j). Now there are two remaining cases:
Case #3 : d(i,0) ≥ d(i+1,0), in which case Condition 1 is violated for the adjacent
pair i and i+1 and we are done.
Case #4 : d(i+1,0) > d(i,0). This implies d(i+1,0) > d(j,0), so Condition 1
is violated for the pair i+1 and j and we are done.
Appendix B: The effect of a switch on the inversion-distance
This section provides a formal proof to an intuitive claim made within the proof of Lemma
3. Let a, b be two fixed alternatives. Let C(a > b) be the set of preferences by which
a  b and C(b > a) the set of preferences by which b  a. Let wab : C(b > a)→ C(a > b) be
a function that takes a preference-relation and creates a new preference-relation by switching
the position of a and b in the ranking.
Lemma 5. If a 0 b, then for every preference 1∈ C(b > a):
d(1,0) > d(wab(1),0)
Proof. For every preference , define D(,0) as the set of pairs-of-alternatives {i, j} that
are ranked differently in  and in 0. By definition, the inversion distance is the cardinality
of this set, d(,0) = |D(,0)|. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that there are more
pairs in D(1,0) than in D(wab(1),0). To show this, we consider all possible pairs-
of-alternatives; for each pair, we calculate its contribution to the difference in cardinalities
|D(1,0)| − |D(wab(1),0)|, and show that the net difference is positive.
• The pair {a, b} is in D(1,0) but not in D(wab(1),0), so this pair contributes +1
to the difference.
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• Any pair that contains neither a nor b is not affected by the switch. I.e, each pair {c, e}
where c, e 6= a, b is in D(1,0) if-and-only-if it is in D(wab(1),0), so it contributes
0 to the difference.
• Let c be an alternative that is ranked by 1 above b or below a, i.e, either c 1 b 1 a
or b 1 a 1 c. Then, the order between c to a or b in 1 is not affected by the switch,
so {c, a} is in D(1,0) if-and-only-if it is in D(wab(1),0), so it contributes 0 to
the difference. The same is true for {c, b}.
• Finally, let c be an alternative that is ranked by 1 between a and b, i.e, b 1 c 1 a.
Then, the switch wab changes the direction of both the pair {c, a} and the pair {c, b}:
– If c 0 a 0 b, then the pair {c, a} is in D(0, wab(1)) but not in D(0,1),
and the pair {c, b} is in D(0,1) but not in D(0, wab(1)), so these pairs
contribute +1− 1 = 0 to the difference.
– If a 0 c 0 b, then both the pair {c, a} and the pair {c, b} are in D(0,1) but
not in D(0, wab(1)), so these pairs contribute +1 + 1 = 2 to the difference.
– If a 0 b 0 c, then the pair {c, a} is in D(0,1) but not in D(0, wab(1)),
and the pair {c, b} is in D(0, wab(1)) but not in D(0,1), so these pairs
contribute +1− 1 = 0 to the difference.
We proved that the contribution of each pair of alternatives is at least 0, and the contribution
of the pair {a, b} is +1. Therefore, the difference |D(1,0)| − |D(wab(1),0)| is positive
and the lemma is proved.
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Appendix C: Probability that binomial random variables are equal
This section justifies the following approximation, used in Section IV.
Let B1, . . . , Bt be i.i.d. random variables distributed binomially with m trials and success-
probability p < 1/2. Let q := 1− p. Define:
P equal(m, p, t) := Pr[B1 = · · · = Bt]
Then, for every t ≥ 1, when m is sufficiently large,
P equal(m, p, t) ≈ 1
(
√
2pipqm)t−1
Proof. The value of each of the variables Bi can be any integer between 0 and m. Therefore
we can present P equal as a sum of probabilities of disjoint events:
P equal(m, p, t) =
m∑
i=0
Pr[B1 = · · · = Bt = i]
Since the Bi are i.i.d:
P equal(m, p, t) =
m∑
i=0
(Pr[B1 = i])
t
=
m∑
i=0
((
m
i
)
piqm−i
)t
where q := 1− p. Using Stirling’s approximation, when m, i,m− i are sufficiently large:(
m
i
)
≈
√
m
2pii(m− i) ·
mm
ii(m− i)m−i
Substitute this in P equal and approximate the sum by an integral:
P equal(m, p, t) ≈
∫ m
y=0
(√
m
2piy(m− y) ·
mm
yy(m− y)m−y · p
yqm−y
)t
dy
Substitute y = mx and dy = mdx:
P equal(m, p, t) ≈ m
∫ 1
x=0
(√
1
2pimx(1− x) ·
pmxqm−mx
xmx(1− x)m−mx
)t
dx
= m1−t/2
∫ 1
x=0
(√
1
2pix(1− x) ·
pmxqm−mx
xmx(1− x)m−mx
)t
dx
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The integral can be approximated by Laplace’s method. Define:
h(x) :=
(√
1
2pix(1− x)
)t
g(x) := t ·
[
x ln(
p
x
) + (1− x) ln( q
1− x)
]
Then:
P equal(m, p, t) ≈ m1−t/2
∫ 1
x=0
h(x)emg(x)dx
The function g(x) is twice continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and has a unique maximum
at x0 =
p
p+q
= p; the maximum value is g(x0) = 0. Moreover, g
′′(x0) = − 1pq < 0. Therefore,
by Laplace’s method:
P equal(m, p, t) ≈ m1−t/2
√
2pi
−mg′′(x0) · h(x0) · e
mg(x0)
where the symbol ≈ means that the ratio between the expressions in its two sides goes to 1
as m→∞. Substituting the functions g and h gives:
P equal(m, p, t) ≈ m1−t/2
√
2pi
m/(pq)
·
(
1
2pipq
)t/2
· e0
= m(1−t)/2 · (2pipq)(1−t)/2
= (2pipqm)(1−t)/2
P equal(m, p, t) ≈ 1
(
√
2pipqm)t−1
Note that P equal(m, p, 1) = 1, which is trivially true, since a single random variable always
equals itself. When t ≥ 2, P equal(m, p, 1)→ 0 as m→∞.
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